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The Last Day for First Day Orders: Attacks on the
Practice of Paying Prepetition Claims of
Certain "Critical Vendors"
Brandi McCoy1
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to understand the effects that first day orders2 can have on
small creditors, imagine that you are a corporation. You supply Com-
pany A with products that are important to Company A's business.
Company A owes you $300,000, which is a small fraction of what
Company A owes to other suppliers. Company A petitions for Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy and files an emergency motion requesting the abil-
ity to pay certain critical suppliers that are necessary to the
continuance of its business. You, however, are not on its list. The
bankruptcy court, in granting Company A's motion, allows the credi-
tors paid to receive a greater percentage of what they are owed than it
allows you to receive.
There are two major purposes behind the Bankruptcy Code
("Code"). One major purpose of the Code is to assure that creditors
receive equal treatment. 3 The other is to give the debtor a fresh start
in aiding the reorganization of the debtor's business.4 First day orders
undercut the first purpose by treating "critical vendors," those ven-
dors that the debtor believes are necessary for continued operation of
its business, differently than those who the debtor does not believe are
critical. In granting first day orders based on the debtor's assertion
that payment to certain creditors is necessary to continue operating its
business, the bankruptcy court exercises its equitable powers, placing
more importance on providing the debtor with a fresh start than on
1. The author would like to thank Kurt Carlson, a partner at Tishler and Wald, Ltd. in Chi-
cago, Illinois, for his help in developing the topic of this Comment.
2. The phrases "first day orders" and "critical vendor orders" will be used interchangeably in
this Comment. The phrase "first day orders" will not be used to refer to any of the other mo-
tions that debtors file at the time a bankruptcy petition is filed.
3. Joseph Gilday, "Critical" Error: Why Essential Vendor Payments Violate the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 411, 414 (2003). Gilday described this purpose as "one of
the Code's basic-canons." Id.
4. Andrew J. Currie & Sean McCann, Hold on to Those Payments, Critical Vendors: Capital
Factors v. Kmart, AM. BANKR. INST. J., 2003 ABI JNL. LEXIS 100, at *9-*10.
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treating creditors equally. The current debate discusses whether or
not the Code authorizes the bankruptcy court to make such a choice.
Part II will discuss first day orders as an exception to the general
rule that a debtor can not prepetition claims. This section will also
outline the general requirements of procedural due process. Part III
will review caselaw that discusses first day orders. This section will
outline the basics behind the argument that bankruptcy courts lack
statutory authority to make such orders. In addition, this section will
discuss the background behind the argument that first day orders lack
procedural due process. Part IV will analyze both arguments made in
Part III and will present the reasoning behind accepting the argu-
ments. Part V will provide the two most feasible solutions to the criti-
cal vendor problem: 1) a blanket prohibition of such orders and 2) a
revision to the Code that expressly authorizes the bankruptcy courts
to enter such orders. Part VI will conclude by summarizing the main
points outlined in this Comment.
II. BACKGROUND
This section will explain the meaning first day orders and the his-
tory or such orders. It will also discuss general procedural due process
principles.
A. What Are First Day Orders?
The general rule is that once a bankruptcy petition is filed, a debtor
cannot pay the prepetition claims of creditors.5 By allowing the
debtor to pay part or even all of the prepetition claims of certain "crit-
ical" vendors, 6 first day orders act an exception to that general rule.7
At one time, the post-petition payment in the ordinary course of
business of pre-petition, unsecured trade suppliers to maintain their
goodwill and thereby maintain the going-concern value of the dis-
5. Currie & McCann, supra note 4, at *1. Typically creditors are not paid until after a reor-
ganization plan has been confirmed by the creditors and approved by the court. Gilday, supra
note 3, at 417. Every mention of creditors in this Comment refers to general unsecured credi-
tors, and every mention of pre-petition claims refers to a creditor's right to payment that due to
a transaction that occurred before the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition.
6. Some illustrations of creditors that courts have determined to be critical vendors include
footwear suppliers for a shoe retailer, "lumber suppliers [for] a building material retailer," and
film distributors for a movie theater. Gilday, supra note 3, at 415-16 (citing In re Just for Feet.
Inc., 242 B.R. 821 (D. Del. 1999), In re Payless Cashways, Inc., 268 B.R. 543 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
2001), and In re Wehrenberg, Inc., 260 B.R. 468 (Bankr. E.W. Mo. 2001), respectively).
7. Currie & McCann, supra note 4.
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tressed company would have been truly extraordinary.... Now it
has become an inalienable right of debtors and trade vendors alike.8
However, "[t]he concept of 'critical vendors' has gone from an ex-
traordinary remedy to something that is simply done as a matter of
course in almost all cases."9
Bankruptcy court authority for these orders is typically gleaned
from the Doctrine of Necessity, 10 which debtors use to argue that the
courts have authority to authorize payment of prepetition claims to
"ensure continuation of ... [d]ebtors' operations."" The Doctrine of
Necessity grew from case law both prior to and under the Bankruptcy
Act of 1978.12 The current Doctrine of Necessity is a combination of
two separate doctrines: 1) the Six Months Rule and 2) the Necessity of
Payment Rule.13 The Six Months Rule 14 was recognized in the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 15 placed in the chapter that dealt with railroad reorganiza-
tions,16 and later adopted in the subchapter of the Code dealing with
railroad reorganizations. 7 Historically, both the Six Months Rule and
the Necessity of Payment Rule were applicable only to railroad reor-
ganizations cases because the success of those reorganizations was
considered essential to the public interest. 18 However, the Necessity
8. Thomas J. Salerno, Hell Hath No Fury Like a Critical Vendor Scorned, Am. BANKR. INST.
J., 2003 ABI JNL. LEXIS 114, at "1.
9. Id. at *10.
10. Currie & McCann, supra note 4, at "1. Because the Doctrine of Necessity is the basis for
granting critical vendor motions, this Comment will use the Doctrine of Necessity and critical
vendor orders interchangeably.
11. In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487, 493 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
12. Id. at 492 n.7.
13. Id.
14. "The Six Months Rule, a rule of priority, originated with the practice of initiating a rail-
road receivership case with an order appointing a receiver who was authorized to pay certain
pre-petition debts for labor, supplies or equipment from post-petition funds." Id. It was an
equitable rule that only applied to expenses that were necessary for the continued operation of
the railroad. Id. It was limited to expenses that arose immediately prior to filing the receiver-
ship petition. Id. See also In re Boston & Maine Corp., 634 F.2d 1359, 1366-67 (1st Cir. 1980)
(providing a history of the Six Months Rule).
15. Boston & Maine, 634 F.2d at 1366. The Six Months Rule, although recognized by § 77(b)
of the Bankruptcy Act, was not precisely defined. Id. The priority rules of the Six Months Rule
are incorporated into § 1171(b) by reference. William L. Norton, Jr., 2 NORTON BANKR. L. &
PRAc. 2d § 42:10 (2003).
16. No similar section was located in any other part of the Code. CoServ, 273 B.R. at 493 n.7.
"Congress made a conscious decision when enacting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 to
confine the Six Months Rule to railroad reorganizations." Norton, supra note 15.
17. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 1171(b) (2000) (containing almost identical language as § 77(b) in the
Bankruptcy Act). This subchapter, Subchapter IV of Chapter 11, applies only to cases concern-
ing railroad reorganizations. 11 U.S.C. § 103(h) (2000).
18. Patricia L. Barsalou, Preferential First Day Orders - A Question for Congress, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., 1994 ABI JNL. LEXIS 2702, at *4.
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of Payment Rule,19 although originally limited to railroad reorganiza-
tions, has occasionally been extended outside the railroad context. 20
The Doctrine of Necessity has been considered incorporated into
the Code through 11 U.S.C. section 105(a), 21 which states "[t]he court
may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appro-
priate to carry out the provisions of this title. ' ' 22 The provisions of the
Code are aimed at successful reorganization of companies, which is
one of the goals of the Code. 23
There are three arguments that debtors often make when relying on
the Doctrine of Necessity in the critical vendor context. 24 First, the
vendor is the only supplier of "essential goods and services. '25 Sec-
ond, the vendor supplies "essential goods and services at a signifi-
cantly reduced price."' 26 Third, because the vendor will not be able to
"survive non-payment of pre-petition claims," it will stop supplying
the debtor.27
First day orders began as an instrument only to aid railroads in con-
tinuing their operations after entering receivership. First day orders
have become a tool used by debtors in all industries because "the
debtor relies on certain vendors for critical products and services, and
19. The Necessity of Payment Rule was first enunciated by the United States Supreme Court
in Miltenberger v. Logansport, C. & S.W. Ry. Co., 106 U.S. 286, 311 (1882). Boston & Maine, 634
F.2d at 1369. The Necessity of Payment Rule, unlike the Six Months Rule, is a rule of compelled
payment rather than priority. CoServ, 273 B.R. at 492 n.7; Norton, supra note 15, § 42:11. It
developed to protect trustees of a railroad when continued operation of the railroad was being
threatened. In re B & W Enterprises, Inc., 713 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing In re Boston
& Marine Corp, 634 F.2d 1359, 1382 (1st Cir. 1980); In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 458 F. Supp.
1234, 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affd in part, remanded in part, 596 F.2d 1102 (3rd Cir. 1979)). "The
rule may be invoked ... as justification for the payment of pre-petition debts paid under duress
to secure continued supplies or services essential to the continued operation of the railroad." Id.
(citing In re Boston & Marine Corp, 634 F.2d 1359, 1382 (1st Cir. 1980)). This rule has been used
by courts to allow immediate payment to creditors when those creditors will not supply goods or
services that are essential to the continued operation of the business until their claims have been
paid. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 467 F.2d 100, 102 n.1 (3d Cir. 1972).
20. CoServ, 273 B.R. at 493 n.7. The extension of the Necessity of Payment Rule gave birth to
the Doctrine of Necessity. Id. Courts often use the two terms interchangeably. Id. This Com-
ment will, however, use the Doctrine of Necessity.
21. Currie & McCann, supra note 4, at *5. Although the Doctrine of Necessity is not actually
codified in the Code, courts have used their equitable powers under section 105(a) of the code to
apply the Doctrine of Necessity. In re Just for Feet, Inc. 242 B.R. 821, 824 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999).
Some question whether the rule is still valid under the Code. See Norton, supra note 19.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)(2000).
23. Currie & McCann, supra note 4, at *9-*10. Another goal of the Code is equal treatment
of creditors. In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 86 B.R. 922, 932 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
24. Currie & McCann, supra note 4, at *6.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. Vendors would likely stop supplying the debtor because without payment through a
first day order, the vendor will get little or no money in payment of its pre-petition claim.
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unless the debtor is permitted to pay its prepetition debts to these
essential vendors, they likely will stop supplying the debtor, and the
debtor's chances of successfully reorganizing will be impaired. 2 8
B. What is Procedural Due Process?
Due process requires the opportunity to be heard.29 The right to be
heard has little meaning unless one is given notice and can decide
whether or not to appear and present objections.30 Put together, "the
conditions for due process are reasonably calculated notice under all
of the circumstances and an opportunity to be heard. '
31
As one can tell from the definition, notice is the critical factor in
determining whether a violation of due process exits. Notice serves to
apprise parties of an upcoming hearing as well as to allow time for
adequate preparation. 32 There are three requirements regarding the
sufficiency of notice for procedural due process purposes. First, "[t]he
notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required
information. '33 Second, the notice "must afford a reasonable time for
those interested to their appearance. ' 34 Third, "[t]he means em-
ployed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absen-
tee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it."35
Even with the requirements for notice, the Supreme Court has
made "clear that '[due] process is flexible and calls for such procedu-
ral protections as the particular situation demands." 36 The only re-
quirement is that the matter be considered "at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner. '37 If a party is given a meaningful opportu-
nity to be heard but does not take advantage of that opportunity,
there is no violation of due process.38
28. Currie & McCann, supra note 4, at *1-*2. See also Catherine A. Vance & Paige Barr, The
Facts & Fictions of Bankruptcy Reform, 1 DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 361, 390 (2003) (stating
"the justification for [critical vendor claims] is ... if the prepetition claim is not satisfied, the
vendor will not deal with the debtor postpetition, and the debtor will have no viable shot at
reorganizing").
29. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (quoting Grannis
v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
30. Id. at 314.
31. In re U.S. Metalsource Corp., 163 B.R. 260, 268 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993).
32. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978).
33. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914)).
34. Id. (citing Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900)).
35. Id. at 315.
36. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. at 15 n.15 (1978) (quoting Mor-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
37. Fitzgerald v. Town of Kingston, 13 F. Supp. 2d 119, 123 (D. Mass. 1998) (quoting Arm-
strong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
38. In re Spookyworld, Inc., 266 B.R. 1, 12 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001).
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III. DEBATE SURROUNDING FIRST DAYS ORDERS
This section will discuss the debate regarding the validity of first day
orders. Courts are split on the issue of whether courts lack the statu-
tory authority to issue first day orders. Rather than discussing statu-
tory authority, some courts discuss first day orders in the context of
procedural due process.
A. Do Critical Vendor Orders Lack Statutory Authority?
When a noncritical vendor brings a challenge to a first day order,
the court must determine whether or not the bankruptcy courts have a
statutory basis for issuing such orders. There is a split of authority
among the United States Bankruptcy Courts as to whether the Code
authorizes bankruptcy courts to order payment of prepetition claims
of so-called critical vendors.39 The two cases that follow demonstrate
the competing views among bankruptcy courts.
1. Capital Factors, Inc. v. Kmart Corp.40
The argument that first day orders lack statutory authority has re-
cently been accepted by the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois in Capital Factors, Inc. v. Kmart Corp.41 Kmart Corporation
("Kmart") "filed a voluntary petition for reorganization under Chap-
ter 11" of the Bankruptcy Code ("Code"). 42 Kmart filed a first day
motion on the same day, seeking authority to pay the prepetition
claims of certain critical vendors. 43 Kmart asserted that these "pay-
ments were necessary to maintain relationships essential to its contin-
ued operation," thereby invoking the Doctrine of Necessity and 11
39. See Capital Factors, Inc. v. Kmart Corp. 291 B.R. 818, 823 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (holding that
the Code does not authorize such orders); In re Oxford Mgmt., Inc., 4 F.3d 1329, 1334 (5th Cir.
1993) (holding that in ordering payment of pre-petition claims to certain creditors, the bank-
ruptcy court impermissibly altered the Code); Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey,
832 F.2d 299, 302 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that not only do such orders lack statutory authority,
but they also violate the language of the Code); It re B & W Enter., Inc., 713 F.2d 534, 537 (9th
Cir. 1983) (declining to apply the Doctrine of Necessity outside the context of railroad). But see
CoServ, 273 B.R. at 497 (holding that section 105(a) of the Code does authorize such payments);
In re Wehrenberg, Inc., 260 B.R. 468, 469 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2001) (granting, pursuant to section
105(a) of the Code, the debtor's motion to pay critical vendors); In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R.
821, 824 (D. Del. 1999) (holding that "[s]ection 105(a) of the Code provides a statutory basis" for
critical vendor orders); In re Chateaugay Corp., 80 B.R. 279, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that
the bankruptcy court has authority to authorize payment of certain pre-petition claims).
40. 291 B.R. 818 (N.D. Il1. 2003).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 820.
43. Id.
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U.S.C. section 105(a). 44 The same day that Kmart filed its petition
and first day motion, the bankruptcy court held a hearing on the mo-
tion.45 Capital Factors, Inc.46 ("Capital") objected to the motion. 47
The bankruptcy court granted the motion for payments to the critical
vendors ("Critical Vendors Motion"), 48 and Capital appealed to the
district court. 49
The district court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not confer
upon the bankruptcy court the authority to authorize such payments.
50
The Doctrine of Necessity has been applied to "justify the pre-plan
payment of pre-petition claims of creditors who threaten to withhold
goods or services believed critical to the debtor's continued" vitality.
5
'
44. Id. Section 105(a) states that "[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that
is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)(2002).
45. Capital Factors, 291 B.R. at 820.
46. Capital Factors, Inc. is a factoring agent that "purchases accounts receivable from its cus-
tomers and assumes the collection responsibilities." Id. at 820 n.1. Capital Factors, Inc.'s clients
include several Kmart apparel suppliers. Id. at 820. The claims assumed by Capital amount to
approximately twenty million dollars. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. The bankruptcy court stated with regard to the Motion:
Motions to pay certain critical trade creditors always present difficult questions for
courts. We're more and more of [critical vendor motions], and our problem is that we
to stretch to find some authority to [grant critical vendor motions]. However, I, after
hearing this testimony and reading the affidavit [of Charles C. Conaway, Kmart's Chief
Executive Officer], am convinced that Fleming, Handleman and the egg and dairy ven-
dors ... as well as the advertising concerns, are necessary to keep [Kmart] going as a
going concern.
Id. at 820 (internal quotation marks omitted). Fleming Companies Inc. is Kmart's largest sup-
plier and supplies Kmart with almost all of its food and with its infrastructure for its food busi-
nesses. Bruce S. Nathan, Critical Vendors: Elevating the Low-Priority Unsecured Claims of Pre-
Petition Trade Creditors, AM. BANKR. INST. J., 2002 ABI JNL. LEXIS 93, at *8-*9. Handleman
Co. is Kmart's sole music supplier and supplies infrastructure for Kmart's music businesses. Id.
at *9.
49. Capital Factors, 291 B.R. at 821. Capital raised several issues on appeal, but the only one
relevant to the discussion in this Comment is "whether 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) or the 'Doctrine of
Necessity' provides a bankruptcy court with either the statutory authority or equitable power to
allow the payment of selected prepetition unsecured . . . claims" before confirmation of the
Chapter 11 plan. Id. at 821. Capital raised what it thought to be a separate issue, "whether 'a
bankruptcy court may utilize' § 105(a) or the 'Doctrine of Necessity' 'to circumvent explicit pro-
visions of the Bankruptcy Code."' Id. However, the district court viewed this issue as the same
as the above issue. Id.
50. Id. at 823. The district court held that it could not "ignore the Bankruptcy Code's scheme
of priority in favor of 'equity,' especially in light of" a statement made by the Seventh Circuit.
Id. "The fact that a [bankruptcy] proceeding is equitable does not give the [bankruptcy] judge a
free-floating discretion to redistribute rights in accordance with his personal views of justice and
fairness, however enlightened those views may be." In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac.
R.R. Co., 791 F.2d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1986). Equity in a bankruptcy proceeding functions as a
guide for the "division of a pie that is too small to allow each creditor to get the slice for which
he originally contracted." Id.
51. Capital Factors, 291 B.R. at 822.
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Congress has not codified the doctrine,52 so "the only way to apply it
is through section 105(a). '' 53 The Code does not "carve out priority"
for prepetition claims based on the critical status of the creditor.5 4
The bankruptcy court's order elevated the claims of the so-called criti-
cal vendors over claims of other noncritical creditors.55 The bank-
ruptcy court "altered the priority scheme" provided for by the Code. 56
It is clear that regardless of the usefulness such orders may have, they
are not authorized by the Code.57 Having its order reversed by the
district court, Kmart appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit, 58 which upheld the district court's decision.59
2. In re CoServ, L.L.C 60
In contrast to the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas held that sec-
tion 105(a) of the Code does in fact authorize bankruptcy courts to
authorize payment of prepetition claim to certain creditors that are
critical to the company's continued operation. 61 On November 30,
52. Id. at 823; see also id. at 822. Congress has also not permitted pre-plan payment of pre-
petition claims under any section of the Code. Id. at 822.
53. Id. Section 105(a) provides the bankruptcy court with the power to issue any order that is
necessary to carry out provisions of the Code. Id. at 821.
54. Id. at 822.
55. Id. The bankruptcy court "subordinate[d] the claims of non-'critical' . . . creditors." Id.
56. Capital Factors, 291 B.R. at 822. Under the general priority scheme required by the Code,
creditors' "claims are paid based on where they are situated on the claims priority ladder." Na-
than, supra note 48, at *4. The claims of creditors situated on the same rung of the ladder, which
are those in the same class, are entitled to the same treatment. Id. Situated on the top rung of
the ladder and entitled to payment first are secured and lien creditors. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(a)). The next rung of the ladder contains administrative priority claims, such claims in-
clude those of creditors that provide the debtor with goods and services during the bankruptcy
case. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)). Lower-level priority claims occupy the next rungs of the
ladder in a designated order and are entitled to payment only after all of the administrative
priority claims have been paid in full. Id. (citing 11. U.S.C. § 507(a)(2)-(9)). Unsecured pre-
petition creditors occupy the lowest rung of the ladder and are not entitled to payment until all
of the higher priority claims have been paid in full. Id. at *4-*5.
57. Capital Factors, 291 B.R. at 823. The district court recognized that such orders may be
beneficial. Id. "[P]re-plan payment of certain prepetition claims allows the debtor to minimize
disruptions in doing business," and this may actually further reorganization. Id. The district
court focused not on the potential benefits of these orders but focused on the fact that such
orders simply are not authorized by the Code. Id.
58. Salerno, supra note 8, at *8.
59. In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 874 (7th Cir. 2004). The court based its decision on
similar considerations as did the district court. See id. at 871-73. The court stated that § 105(a)
does not give the bankruptcy court the right to sidestep the Code's priority and distribution
rules. Id. at 871.
60. 273 B.R. 487 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
61. CoServ, 273 B.R. at 497. According to this court, the Doctrine of Necessity is a "rule of
payment not of priority." Id. at 493 n.7.
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2001, the debtors filed petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code.62 Debtors claimed that they owe National Rural
Utilities Cooperative Finance Cooperation ("Lender") about $26 mil-
lion in prepetition debt.63 Debtors also claimed that the sale of their
assets to Stellar Holdings, L.L.C., in the amount of $90 million, would
provide substantial return to all creditors.64 Lender disputed the
amount owed to it and asserted the amount was substantially in excess
of the $90 million the sale would produce.65
Debtors filed an Emergency Motion for Order Authorizing Pay-
ment of Prepetition Claims of Critical Vendors ("Motion") at the
same time that they filed their bankruptcy petition.66 The court held
the hearing on the Motion on December 20, 2001.67 Only one credi-
tor, designated by Debtors as a critical vendor, participated in the
hearing.68
The bankruptcy court held that the Code, through section 105(a),
provides tile bankruptcy court with the power to authorize payment of
certain prepetition claims. 69 Only section 105(a) would allow the
bankruptcy court to violate the general principle that general prepeti-
tion claims of unsecured creditors shall be treated equally.70 Bank-
ruptcy courts can order such payments only under extraordinary
circumstances. 71 While the court decided that it did not possess the
broad power advocated by the debtors, 72 it did posses the authority to
allow such payments if necessary to the performance of the trustee's
fiduciary duty, which includes preserving an operating business's
value. 73
The court also created a three-element test for determining when
such payments will be allowed. 74 The test that the court announced
62. Id. at 489.
63. Id. at 490.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. CoServ, 273 B.R. at 490.
67. Id. Debtors, thereafter, narrowed their request to seven creditors to whom Debtors
wanted to pay over $500,000. Id. Lender did not announce its support or objection to this
reduced request. Id.
68. Id. at 490.
69. Id. at 497.
70. Id. at 493. "Only Section 105(a) offers the equitable muscle that would allow a bank-
ruptcy court to violate one of the principal tenets of Chapter 11." Id. The principal tenet re-
ferred to by the bankruptcy court is that prepetition claims of creditors be satisfied on an equal
basis. Id.
71. CoServ, 273 B.R. at 494.
72. Id. at 495.
73. Id. at 497.
74. Id. at 498-499.
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contained three elements that the debtor must meet before the bank-
ruptcy court may authorize payment of prepetition debt to so-called
critical venders. 75 First, the debtor must demonstrate that dealing
with the claimant is indispensable to profitable operations or preser-
vation of the estate.76 Second, the debtor must demonstrate that fail-
ing to deal with the claimant will likely cause harm or eliminate an
economic advantage that is greater than the amount claimed.77 Third,
the debtor must demonstrate that there exists no practical or legal
alternative by which the debtor can deal with the claimant and that
payment is the only alternative. 78 These three criteria must be proven
by a preponderance of the evidence.79
B. Do Critical Vendor Orders Violate Procedural Due Process?
Noncritical vendors argue that the issuance of first day orders of-
fends procedural due process.80 The basis for this argument stems
from the fact that the hearings for first day orders often occur either
on the same day or the day after the debtor files its bankruptcy peti-
tion.81 This leaves little or no time for notice to be sent to all inter-
ested parties.
75. Id. at 498.
76. CoServ, 273 B.R. at 498. "To meet this requirement debtor must show that, for one reason
or another, dealing with the claimant is virtually indispensable to profitable operations or preser-
vation of the estate." Id. This element may be satisfied when the claim sought to be paid is that
of either the sole supplier of a certain product or a creditor that has "control over valuable
property of the estate." Id.
77. Id. "[A] debtor must show that meaningful economic gain to the estate or to the going-
concern value of the business will result or that serious economic harm will be avoided through
payment of the prepetition claim, which itself is materially less than the potential loss to the
estate or business." Id. at 498-99. This means that if the debtor does not deal with the creditor,
the debtor risks the harm or loss of economic advantage to the estate of the debtor's going
concern value, which is disproportionate to the amount of the claimant's prepetition claim. Id.
78. Id. at 499. This element will not be met if the payment is merely intended to alleviate the
creditor's concern about future payment because there are alternatives that do not violate the
principles of the Code. Id. "If payment is intended to assuage the [creditor's] concern about
future dealings, a deposit, collect on delivery terms, payment of shipment and countless other
devices are available that will not offend the general principle that prepetition claims should not
be paid." Id.
79. Id. at 498.
80. See In re U.S. Metalsource Corp., 163 B.R. 260, 266 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993) (explaining
that the creditor argues for modification of the first day order "because it is void for lack of
procedural due process").
81. See Capital Factors, 291 B.R. at 820 (stating that the hearing on the critical vendor motion
was the same day as Kmart filed its bankruptcy petition); Metalsource, 163 B.R. at 262 (stating
that the hearing on the first day motion was held the day after the bankruptcy petition was filed).
But see CoServ, 273 at 490 (stating that the bankruptcy court held the first day hearings five days
after the petition was filed).
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Although few courts have addressed the question of whether or not
first day orders offend due process, one bankruptcy court has an-
swered in the negative. 82 U.S. Metalsource Corp. ("Metalsource")
filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 11.83 On the
same day that it filed for bankruptcy, Metalsource filed a motion to
authorize payment of prepetition wages ("Wage Motion"). 84
A hearing was held on the next day, and the Metalsource's attorney
emphasizing that employees are essential to continued operations. 85
Even though the U.S. Trustee was the only party to receive notice of
the hearing, the largest secured creditor was present at the hearing. 86
However, Metalsource did serve a copy of the Wage Order to all
parties on the service list.87
Under the Wage Order, Metalsource continued to employ its prepe-
tition severance policies.88 Metalsource continued to operate at a loss
and did not have a confirmed reorganization plan until almost three
years after its bankruptcy petition was filed. 89 The Official Committee
of Unsecured Creditors Metalsource, Corp. ("Committee") learned
that Metalsource had paid over $1.1 million to employees and paid an
average of over $14,000 to twenty-one salaried employees.90
The Court held that where interested parties have prompt notice of
the first day order, the requirements of due process are met. 91 The
United States Supreme Court set forth the requirements for due pro-
cess as follows: due process is reasonably calculated notice under all of
the circumstances, there must be an opportunity to be heard, and
these two conditions must be reasonably met.92 In applying these re-
quirements to this case, the court held that actual notice, in the form
of the Wage Order, provided within days of the hearing reasonably
82. Metalsource, 163 B.R. at 268. It is important to note that this case involved a wage order
to authorize payment of prepetition wages, not a critical vendor order to authorize payment of
the prepetition claims of creditors. Id. at 262.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 263.
87. Metalsource, 163 B.R. at 263.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 263-64.
90. Id. at 264. The suit was filed based on the payments made to the salaried employees. Id.
91. Id. at 268. Metalsource did not meet the notice requirements of the Bankruptcy Code
because the payments were not in the ordinary course. Id. at 267. The court stated, however,
that this did not necessarily deprive the Committee of due process. Id.
92. Metalsource, 163 B.R. at 267-68 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
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met these requirements. 93 The court did recognize that due to the
urgent nature of most first day orders, "it is difficult for all interested
parties to receive adequate notice of the first day hearings. '94 How-
ever, first day orders can be modified or reconsidered by the court
upon the request of creditors.95 Because "opportunity to be heard [is]
not lost forever" if a party cannot attend the hearing, the "Wage Or-
der is not void for lack of due process. '"96
IV. ANALYSIS
This section will argue that courts lack statutory authority to issue
first day orders. It will also argue that the current process of issuing
first day orders violates procedural due process.
A. First Day Orders Lack Statutory Authority
The disagreement between the bankruptcy courts about their ability
to authorize payment of the prepetition claims of unsecured creditors
can only be resolved by determining who has the power - the bank-
ruptcy courts or Congress. 97 The Code, enacted by Congress, contains
a rather complicated system of checks and balances, the purpose of
which is to promote numerous interests.98 However, according to one
critic, "[t]he problem arises when the bankruptcy judge believes,
rightly or wrongly, that strict compliance with the letter of the statute
may defeat rather than further the underlying policy favoring reorga-
nizations." 99 Some bankruptcy judges believe that they have the au-
thority to overrule the letter of the statute in order to promote
reorganization.' ° However, some courts, including the Capital Fac-
tors court, say that they have no such power. 1 1
This section of the Comment discusses the reasons why the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois correctly decided Capital
93. Metalsource, 163 B.R. at 268. "The Salaried Employee's content that the Committee's
actual notice of the Wage Order within days of its entry was sufficient to reasonably meet the
conditions of procedural due process .... After considering all of the circumstances of this case,
the Court agrees with the Salaried Employees." Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Charles Jordan Tabb, Emergency Preferential Orders in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 65
AM. BANKR. L. 75, 99 (1991).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 99-100. The question that must be asked is "does the judge have what amounts to
a judicial trump card-the power to override the express terms of the statute to further the
reorganizations policy." Id.
101. Id.
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Factors when it held that first day orders lack the authority of the
Code. Allowing payment of the prepetition claim of a "critical ven-
dor" accords that creditor a preferred status not permitted by the
Code.102 The critical vendor doctrine is not authorized by any provi-
sion of the Code. 10 3 Even those who think that section 105(a) does
support use of the Doctrine of Necessity agree that it seems to conflict
with other provisions in the Code, 104 provisions such as those setting
forth the priority scheme in which creditors will be paid.1
05 As the
court in Capital Factors stated, courts cannot disregard the Code's
"scheme of priority in favor of equity. ' 10 6 Because Congress has not
codified the Doctrine of Necessity or provided some other means of
allowing payment of prepetition claims of unsecured creditors, the
court in Capital Factors held that it lacked statutory authority to au-
thorize payment to Kmart's so-called critical vendors, 10 7 and to main-
tain otherwise is "nonsensical."' 1 8 Until Congress amends the Code
and gives creditors with powerful influence over the debtor's business
the right to be paid, bankruptcy "courts have no business rewriting the
Code themselves in misguided attempts to save the debtor."
10 9
Furthermore, approval of critical vendor motions often may lead to
the bankruptcy court paying little or no attention to the Code and one
of its fundamental principles. 110 One bankruptcy court noticed that in
approving critical vendor orders, attempts by debtors to evade the
102. Vance & Barr, supra note 28, at 391.
103. In re Chandler, 292 B.R. 583 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2003). See also Russell A. Eisenberg &
Frances F. Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and Its Parameters, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 5 (1989)
(stating that the Code does not "explicitly authorize[ ] the use of the Doctrine [of Necessity]").
In examining the legislative history of section 105(a), one finds nothing about critical vendors or
the ability of the bankruptcy courts to act in contravention to the priority scheme set forth in the
Code. Gilday, supra note 3, at 432.
104. See id. at 6 (stating that the Doctrine of Necessity "seemingly conflict[s] with some Code
provisions" but is supported by section 105(a)).
105. Currie & McCann, supra note 4, at *9. The agreements authorized by critical vendor
orders and through which a debtor agrees to pay prepetition claims of an unsecured creditor in
exchange for the creditor's promise to continue to ship goods "essentially result in the conver-
sion of lower priority prepetition general unsecured claims into higher priority administrative
claims." Id. This conversion obviously conflicts with the explicit Code language setting forth the
priority scheme in which general unsecured creditors are paid only after all other claims have
been paid in full.
106. Capital Factors, 291 B.R. at 823 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id.
108. Gilday, supra note 3, at 448. "To maintain that courts were given the power to act con-
trary to the Code's specific [priority] restrictions is nonsensical." Id.
109. Id. at 450.
110. Randolph J. Haines, Recent Developments in Chapter 11, 2002 ANN. SUJRV. OF BANKR.
LAW 659 (2002). A critical vendor order specifically contravenes a basic premise of the Code,
similarly situated creditors are entitled to equal distribution of the debtor's assets. Bruce H.
White & William L. Medford, The Doctrine of Necessity and Critical Trade Vendors: The Imprac-
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Code would become the norm rather than the exception. 1 Debtors,
in a number of cases, have persuaded bankruptcy courts to extend the
doctrine beyond nonrailroad reorganizations despite the specific stat-
utory limitations of the Code. 112 One bankruptcy court noted that
"selective repayment of pre-petition debt" would violate the auto-
matic stay required by section 362(a) of the Code. 113 This same court
noted that tolerating such payments contradicts a fundamental princi-
ple behind the Code - that is, similarly situated creditors receive equal
treatment. 114
In order to circumvent the statutory and policy limitations, bank-
ruptcy courts cite section 105(a), which states that "[t]he court may
issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate
to carry out the provisions of this title." 115 Section 105(a) has been
called by some "ever-popular" and "apparently omnipotent,"" 6 a
tone that denotes an overall lack of enthusiasm for the use of section
105(a)."17 Even some bankruptcy judges who grant first day orders
believe that their "authority must be tied to something other than Sec-
tion 105 discretion. 11 8 Even courts that have not definitively held
that critical vendor orders cannot be supported by section 105(a) have
been exceedingly reluctant to grant such orders.119
ticability of Maintaining Post-Petition Business Relations in Mega-Cases, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
2002 ABI JNL. LEXIS 137, at *1.
111. Steven N. Cousins, et. al., First Day Orders: An Examination, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.
213, 218 (2002) (quoting In re Revco D.S., Inc., 91 B.R. 777, 781 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988)).
112. Barsalou, supra note 18, at *5. Barsalou noted also the fact that bankruptcy courts that
extend the Doctrine of Necessity beyond railroad cases do so in contravention of historical limi-
tations in addition to the contravention of statutory limitations.
113. In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 86 B.R. 922, 932 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
114. Id. "Such activity ... would negate the fundamental principle of equality of treatment
among similarly situated creditors." Id.
115. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)(2002).
116. White & Medford, supra note 110, at *3.
117. Some commentators describe the first day orders as "grounded on questionable legal
postulates emanating from § 105 and the Doctrine of Necessity." Cousins, supra note 111, at
213.
118. BANKR. L. DAILY, Views from the Bench: First-Day Issues, Real Estate Bankruptcies, Sec.
363 Sales on Tap at "Views" Program, available on WESTLAW at 9/25/2003 BLD d8 (hereinafter
"Views from the Bench"). Many courts rely on section 364 of the Code for their authority. Id.
However, discussion of section 364 is beyond the scope of this article.
119. Tabb, supra note 97, at 98. Tabb cites In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 86 B.R. 922 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1983), as an example of such a reluctant court. Structurlite, "a manufacturer of light-
weight structural plastic products," moved for authority to pay the prepetition medical claims of
its employees. In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 86 B.R. 922, 923-24 (1983). Structurlite's justifi-
cation was that failure to pay the claims would lead to employee unrest and a decline in produc-
tivity. Id. at 924. There was also a fear that the failure would lead to a strike. Id. "Judge Cole
examined the two divergent lines of authority on the question of the court's power to approve
such payments, and declined to throw his hate in either camp." Tabb, supra note 97, at 98.
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Although bankruptcy courts that approve critical vendor orders do
so under the guise of statutory authority by invoking the equitable
power provided in section 105(a), every time a circuit of the United
States Court of Appeals ("circuit(s)") has been called upon to decide
whether the Doctrine of Necessity should be extended to nonrailroad
reorganizations, those courts have "soundly rejected" such an exten-
sion.120 Additionally, these circuits have rejected reliance on the
broad language in section 105(a). 121 Instead, without exception, these
circuits have disallowed any action that exceeds the authority pro-
vided in the Code, which specifically authorizes payment of prepeti-
tion claims to unsecured creditors only under a confirmed
reorganization plan. 22
Many scholars suggest that no court should have the authority to
approve the payment of an unsecured creditor's prepetition claim
prior to confirmation of the reorganization plan. 23 Under the Code,
unsecured creditors should not be paid before priority creditors; how-
ever, when a critical vendor motion is granted, unsecured creditors are
paid while priority creditors are forced to wait for a reorganization
plan.124 Charles Jordan Tabb, an associate law professor at the Uni-
versity of Illinois College of Law, describes such orders as "con-
fer[ring to creditors] substantive rights of uncertain legality.'
' 2 5
Beyond the uncertain legality of critical vendor orders, such orders
as they stand today - that is, without statutory authority and without
guidelines for when they should be granted - open the door for ma-
Judge Cole was able to stay out of the controversy because the case for authorizing such pay-
ments under section 105(a) has not been made. Structurlite, 86 B.R. at 932.
120. Barsalou, supra note 18, at *6. See B & W Enterprises, 713 F.2d at 537; In re Johnson
Bronze Co., 578 F.2d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 1985); Mabey, 832 F.2d at 302; Oxford Mgmt., 4 F.3d at
1334. Although Barsalou was speaking of cases decided up to 1994, there seems still to be no
circuit decision approving the extension of the Doctrine of Necessity.
121. Id. The fact that every circuit that has decided a case on the Doctrine of Necessity has
rejected its application to general businesses illustrates the fact that the critical vendor orders
have no statutory basis. Furthermore, the Doctrine emerged in railroad cases where "the public
interest [was] considered paramount." Tabb, supra note 97, at 99. However, many courts that
approve critical vendor orders do not rely on the public interest rationale that was so important
to the creation of the Doctrine. See id. at 100 (referring to In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R.
174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
122. Barsalou, supra note 18, at *8. "[I]n the absence of a [sic] express grant, a court may
have no power to authorize, outside a confirmed plan, the payment of select pre-petition credi-
tors, regardless of the equities or the economic necessities of the case." Cousins, supra note 111,
at 217.
123. A. Mechele Dikerson, Approving Employee Retention and Severance Programs: Judicial
Discrestion Run Amuck?, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 93, 108 (2003).
124. Barsalou, supra note 18, at *9.
125. Tabb, supra note 97, at 75. Just a few sentences later, Tabb once again describes such
orders as possibly illegal. Id.
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nipulation by creditors. Creditors may engage in "economic black-
mail," using their influence to extort payment of their prepetition
claims.126 Creditors with powerful influence on the debtor's business
negotiate outside the rules in order to avoid limitations provided by
the Code. 127 Such coercive tactics used by creditors to secure preplan
payments of prepetition claims cause debtors to suffer because re-
warding such tactics through authorization of critical vendor motions
eliminate protections against such tactics built into the Code. 128 Such
tactics also increase the financial burden of Chapter 11 cases.129
Additionally, the outcome of a critical vendor motion will depend
on the attitude of a particular bankruptcy judge, which in turn may
influence the debtor's choice of venue. 130 At this point in time, ex-
actly how far the Doctrine of Necessity will reach is left up to each
individual court. 31 One can argue that the CoServ test, if adopted
across circuits, would curb this discretion and reduce the possibility
for forum shopping. However, the CoServ test itself requires judicial
discretion in determining what kind of evidence would be sufficient to
satisfy each prong of the three-prong test by a preponderance of the
evidence.1 32
126. See Nathan, supra note 48, at *11-*12 (discussing CoServ, which states that critical ven-
dors cannot exert their influence to secure payment of prepetition claims).
127. Barsalou, supra note 18, at *10-*11.
128. Id. at *11. Barsalou posits that if courts routinely denied requests for critical vendor
orders, creditors would not have the opportunity to be paid through preferential orders and
might help prevent debtors from being in bankruptcy for an excessive period of time. Id. at *11
n.12.
129. Robert A. Morris, The Case Against "Critical Vendor" Motions, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
2003 ABI JNL. LEXIS 159, *1.
130. Patrick A. Murphy, Initial Stages of the Chapter 11 Case, CREDITORS' RTS. IN BANKR.
§ 16:4 (2d ed. 2003). Debtors engage in forum shopping to file in districts where the bankruptcy
courts accept and apply the Doctrine of Necessity. See id. Where alternative forums are availa-
ble to a debtor, the forum's receptiveness to critical vendor motions is likely to be an important
factor to a debtor in determining in which forum to file the bankruptcy petition. Id. In addition,
bankruptcy courts engage in forum selling to entice debtors to file in their district. Bankruptcy
courts allow and approve critical vendor motions in order to appear "big chapter 11 friendly."
White & Medford, supra note 110, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted). This is particularly
true in the mega-cases, which have several vendors that are allegedly critical. Id.
131. Richard I. Aaron, The Disposition of Encumbered Property, BANKR. L. FUNDAMENTALS
§ 9:6, n.13 (2003). This also leaves the door open for bankruptcy judges to rule in a way that
makes their district attractive to debtors.
132. Although CoServ provides an example of what would satisfy each prong, it does not set
concrete evidentiary requirements that each debtor must provide in order to satisfy the test by a
preponderance of the evidence. See CoServ, 273 B.R. at 498-99. Take the first element of the
CoServ court's test, for example. The first element is that the debtor must deal with the claim-
ant. Id. at 498. The court provided an example of what situation would satisfy this element. The
court stated that "[t]he debtor's customers, sole suppliers of a given product and creditors having
control over valuable property of the [debtor's] estate would satisfy this element." Id. Although
the court said that such claimants would satisfy the first element of the test, it does not provide
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In addition, the evidentiary standards 133 that can be gleaned from
the CoServ test would be impossible to meet in the "mega-cases,"
such as Kmart.134 These evidentiary standards would also be impracti-
cal for emergency first-day hearings135 at which many critical vendor
orders are granted. In order to obtain approval of a critical vendor
motion, a debtor would have to prepare its own testimony, prepare
expert testimony, solicit live testimony or affidavits from the vendor,
and examine and present alternatives to payment to show their
impracticability. 136
There are problems with each of the types of evidence mentioned.
First and foremost, the amount of time required to gather such evi-
dence is extraordinary. 137 Gathering evidence to satisfy all three ele-
ments of the CoServ test is impossible to do for an emergency
hearing, 38 which often occurs on the same day that the bankruptcy
petition is filed 139 or on the next day,140 and is completely impractical
to do in a mega-cases, 141 in which there are numerous vendors that are
purportedly critical. 142 Second, soliciting expert testimony is expen-
sive for a client who is not going through a bankruptcy proceeding, so
imagine the financial impact for a debtor going through bankruptcy.
Third, vendors, who are often not legally sophisticated, are not likely
any guidance about the actual evidence that must be introduced. See id. This leaves open the
door for judicial discretion in what evidence is sufficient and what is not.
133. As used in this context, the phrase evidentiary standards refers what the CoServ court
stated the debtor must show in order to satisfy each element of the three-prong test. Therefore,
those standards are to show: (1) that dealing with the claimant is "virtually indispensable to
profitable operations or to preservation of the estate"; (2) that failing to deal with the claimant
will likely harm the debtor or eliminate an economic advantage that is greater than the amount
of the claim; (3) that there exists no practical or legal alternative by which the debtor can deal
with the claimant other than by payment of the claim. Id. at 498-99.
134. White & Medford, supra note 110, at *2. White and Medford mention "evidentiary pre-
requisites." Id. However, this does not mean that specific types of evidence are required; it
merely means that evidence must be introduced that will satisfy each element of the CoServ
three-prong test. See id. at *6-*7 (outlining what types of evidence may be used to demonstrate
that the "[vendor] is 'virtually indispensable to profitable operations"').
135. Id.
136. See id. at *6-*9.
137. White and Medford describe that task of gathering evidence for element two as a "bur-
densome" one. Id. at *8. Actually, gathering evidence for all three elements is burdensome.
138. See White & Medford, supra note 110, at *11 (stating that the debtor who files an emer-
gency motion has had not time to gather evidence); see id. at *2 (explaining that the evidentiary
standards are impractical for emergency hearings).
139. See, e.g, Capital Factors, 291 B.R. at 820.
140. See, e.g., Metalsource, 163 B.R. at 262.
141. White & Medford, supra note 110, at *2.
142. Id. at *4. The number of vendors in a mega-case could "aggregate to hundreds or even
thousands." Id. at *9.
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to be very cooperative. 143 Therefore, the evidentiary standards re-
quire the debtor to compile an enormous amount of evidence, the
practical ramifications of which may turn out to be counterproductive,
especially in mega-cases,144 such as Kmart.145
B. First Day Orders Offend Procedural Due Process
The debate surrounding critical vendor orders has not been solely
focused on the concerns about their legality or illegality.146 In reality,
much of the controversy has surrounded the procedural rights of the
creditors and the perception that those rights "have been severely
trampled upon."'1 47 The perception stems from the fact that in many
cases the court entered critical vendor orders with little or no notice
having been provided to unsecured creditors. 48
This section of the Comment discusses procedural due process and
the Mullane requirements for notice to be sufficient in order to ensure
due process in the context of first day orders. It is important to re-
member that procedural due process requires the opportunity to be
heard and that the opportunity to be heard means little without suffi-
cient notice. 149 However, "the rapidity with which [critical vendor]
orders are entered - often within the first few days of the case, well
before ... notice of the bankruptcy filing, much less of hearing - cre-
ates due process concerns that may call the validity of such orders into
question.' 50 It is also important to remember that the opportunity to
be heard must be meaningful. 51
Having a meaningful opportunity to be heard is the first require-
ment of procedural due process. A creditor in a bankruptcy proceed-
143. Id. at *8. If vendors wanted to cooperate with the debtor, they would not require pay-
ment of prepetition claims prior to confirmation of the debtor's reorganization plan. Id.
144. Id. at *9.
145. Although the burden of proof is only preponderance of the evidence, the three prongs, as
illustrated by the court, still require that a great deal of information be compiled. However, the
court does not illustrate how much information would be sufficient to satisfy the burden placed
on the debtor. The court leaves this up to each individual bankruptcy judge without providing
any real guidance.
146. Tabb, supra note 97, at 102.
147. Id.
148. Id. Another reason for this perception is that payment of unsecured creditors' prepeti-
tion claims is preferred by the debtor's management even at the expense of secured creditors'
claims. Jo Ann J. Brighton, The Doctrine of Necessity: Is it Really Necessary?, 10 J. BANKR. L. &
PRAC. 107, 109 (2000).
149. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. Sufficient notice is determined under all of the circum-
stances of the case. Metalsource, 163 B.R. at 268.
150. Patricia L. Barsalou & Zack Mosner, Preferential First-day Orders: Same Question, Dif-
ferent Look, AM. BANKR. INST. J., 2003 ABI JNL. LEXIS 7, at *1.
151. See Fitzgerald, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 123.
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ing has little, if any, meaningful opportunity to be heard in the case of
first day orders because such orders occur so quickly after the filing of
the bankruptcy petition. The court in Metalsource thought that the
opportunity to be heard was not lost upon entry of a first day order
approved without prior notice to the creditors because such an order
can be modified. 152 This presupposes, however, that the debtor has
not made any of the payments authorized by the order. If payments
have been made, it is very difficult to get money back from
creditors.153
In re U.S. Metalsource Corp., even though it was a case in which the
court held that the critical vendor orders did not violate procedural
due process, highlighted the "damage caused by procedural shortcuts
on first-day orders and [the] improbability of 'unringing the bell' once
an order is entered." 154 The court refused to modify the order be-
cause too much time had passed between the entry of the order and
when the creditors objected and found it "difficult to undo what has
already been done. ' 155 Although nineteen months had passed be-
tween the entry of the order in Metalsource and the creditors' objec-
tion,1 56 it is possible that even a timely objection would have been too
late if the debtor made payments the day that the order was entered.
The ability of the noncritical vendors to be heard becomes meaning-
less because although they can move for modification of the order,
such modification would likely not change the fact that the debtor's
estate has been reduced.
In addition to the opportunity to be heard, for the entry of a critical
vendor order to pass procedural due process muster, the three re-
quirements of notice must be met: 1) notice must reasonably convey
the required information, 57 2) notice must provide parties with a rea-
sonable time to appear,158 and 3) the way in which notice is given must
be one that someone wishing to actually inform the absent party might
reasonably adopt.159 It is likely that any notice sent will convey the
required information, thereby satisfying the first requirement. It is
also likely that notice will be sent according to accepted procedures,
thus satisfying the third requirement.
152. Metalsource, 163 B.R. at 268.
153. See Currie & McCann, supra note 4, at *16 (noting the practical difficulty of recapturing
payments made based on a critical vendor order).
154. Barsalou & Mosner, supra note 150, at *3 n.3.
155. Metalsource, 163 B.R. at 271.
156. Id. at 267.
157. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914)).
158. Id. (citing Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900)).
159. Id. at 315.
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However, the second requirement, providing reasonable time to ap-
pear, is the fatal requirement for first day orders. First day hearings
may be on the same day that the motion is filed (it is more likely that
the hearings will be held within the first two days).160 Notice can even
be as limited as several hours. 161 This provides the creditors' counsel
with little, if any, time to prepare their objections before the hearing
takes place. In fact, "[i]t is possible that many creditors [do] not get
notice of the hearing in tome to attend."1 62 Such a limited amount of
time does not satisfy the requirement that notice provide a reasonable
time to appear. Many courts have recognized this problem and have
refused to enter critical vendor orders in the absence of adequate no-
tice being provided to those who would be disadvantaged by entry of
such an order. 163
Some bankruptcy judges who grant critical vendor orders recognize
the notice problem that such orders create. Judge Gregory W. Zive, a
bankruptcy judge for the District of Nevada, noted that his primary
concern about first day motions, which includes critical vendor mo-
tions, is whether or not notice has been provided to all interested par-
ties.164 Judge Zive believes that notice is required so that all
interested parties have the opportunity to be heard before money
floods out of the bankruptcy estate. 165 Without the prior notice that
Judge Zive requires, the matter cannot be heard in a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner because secured creditors would not have
the opportunity to be heard.
V. IMPACT: BLANKET PROHIBITION VERSUS
CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION
There are two ways that this problem can be solved: 1) a blanket
prohibition of critical vendor orders or 2) a section in the Code that
authorizes the bankruptcy courts to approve such orders. 166 This sec-
tion of the Comment will discuss the way in which a uniform prohibi-
tion could be adopted as well as the possible legislation that Congress
could enact to resolve the disparate treatment that bankruptcy courts
now provide to first day critical vendor orders.
160. John D. Ayer, et. al., The Life Cycle of a Chapter 11 Debtor Through the Debtor's Eyes,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., 2003 ABI JNL. LEXIS 154, at *6.
161. Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 103, at 26.
162. Barsalou, supra note 18, at *2.
163. Tabb, supra note 97, at 103.
164. Views from the Bench, supra note 118.
165. Id.
166. Tabb, supra note 97, at 115.
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A. Blanket Prohibition
The first possible solution is for bankruptcy judges to implement a
uniform rule against the use of critical vendor orders. 167 The major
appeal with this solution is that it provides uniform treatment to criti-
cal vendor motions. Uniformity is important because critical vendor
motions come up frequently. 168 Also, first day motions are currently
decided according to the attitude of the bankruptcy judge presiding
over the case, and this influences the debtor's venue choice.169 With a
uniform rule against approving first day motions, debtors will no
longer be influenced by the attitude of a particular judge when decid-
ing where to file their bankruptcy petitions.
A blanket prohibition would also solve the procedural due process
problem created by critical vendor orders. If no judge has the author-
ity to approve a critical vendor motion, then there is no problem with
creditors being deprived of money that they are owed without receiv-
ing adequate notice of the critical vendor hearing. It also would pre-
vent the bankruptcy estate from being almost completely depleted
before the noncritical vendors are paid.
In addition, a blanket prohibition would remove the incentive for
influential creditors to manipulate the debtor and the entire bank-
ruptcy system.170 Sophisticated and influential creditors, knowing that
there is no possibility of being paid before confirmation of the
debtor's reorganization plan despite the threat of withholding sup-
plies, would be acting contrary to their own interests.171 Economic
harm to the estate caused by a lack of necessary supplies would harm
the amount of money they would receive under the reorganization
plan.172
There is a large problem with a blanket prohibition on authorizing
payment to critical vendors. The problem with a flat prohibition on
critical vendor orders is the risk that the debtor's suppliers will stop
delivering to the debtor. If this risk is realized, the debtor's reorgani-
zation is jeopardized, and a purpose of the Code is undermined. Be-
cause the risk is different for every debtor and every supplier, a
statutorily authorized balancing approach in which the debtor's rights
167. Id.
168. Id. The filing of critical vendor motions has even been described as a common practice
for debtors. Joshua W. Cohen, Necessity No Longer Critical in Chicago?, NORTON BANKR. L.
ADVISOR (July 2003). Indeed, "it's very clear that vendors demand critical vendor treatment
because they know they can." Morris, supra note 129, at *5.
169. Murphy, supra note 130.
170. Cousins, supra note 111, at 218.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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and needs are weighed against creditors' rights better serves the pur-
poses of the Code than does a blanket prohibition. 173
B. Congressional Legislation
The other possible solution to the problem of first day orders is con-
gressional action. Obviously, the lack of statutory authority problem
would be solved through legislation because Congress would be pro-
viding the courts with the authority. The legislation would have to
address the insufficient notice that is provided when critical vendor
orders are at issue. In addition, the legislation would have to provide
for alterations to the existing priority scheme when critical vendors
are at issue.
First, if Congress were to enact legislation authorizing first day or-
ders, it would need to clearly and unambiguously establish that bank-
ruptcy judges have the power to authorize such orders. The judge's
power would have to "be unequivocally established so that all judges
will consider the use of that power in appropriate circumstances. ' 174
The provision would also have to clearly define what appropriate cir-
cumstances for authorizing such orders would be. For example, ap-
propriate circumstances could be defined according to the CoServ
test. 175 However, concrete evidentiary requirements would have to be
established in order to curb discretion that is allowed under the cur-
rent CoServ test.176
Second, if Congress were to enact legislation authorizing first day
orders, it would need to contain notice requirements that allow all
creditors to be present at the hearing. To conform to procedural due
process, the legislation would have to contain strict procedural guide-
173. The purposes of the Code referred to here include both successful reorganization of the
debtor's business and equal treatment of similarly situated creditors.
174. Tabb, supra note 97, at 115.
175. Granting a critical vendor motion is appropriate when .(1) dealing with the claimant is
"virtually indispensable to profitable operations or to preservation of the estate"; (2) failing to
deal with the claimant will likely harm the debtor or eliminate an economic advantage that is
greater than the amount of the claim; and (3) there exists no practical or legal alternative by
which the debtor can deal with the claimant other than by payment of the claim. CoServ, 273
B.R. at 498-99.
176. For example, the provision would set out that the debtor had to prove all three elements
by a preponderance of the evidence, as the CoServ test does, but also would require specific
pieces of evidence to be produced. This would statutorily require that courts require proof of
the critical nature of the vendor and prohibit rubber-stamping the debtor's request, which evi-
dence suggests has occurred under the current first day order practices. See Brighton, supra note
148, at 108-09 (explaining that courts lean towards authorizing such payments without actually
analyzing whether such payments are in the best interests of creditors). See also Norton, supra
note 19 (stating that there is some "anecdotal evidence suggest[ing] that blanket 'first day or-
ders' are signed authorizing immediate payment of many prepetition claims").
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lines that provide protection for unsecured creditors and their
rights.177 Therefore, the legislation would have to prohibit hearings
held on the same day as the filing of the petition, the day after filing,
and possibly longer. The fifteen day notice required by Bankruptcy
Rule 4001(c) is possible as a notice requirement for critical vendor
orders.178 This will provide all creditors with a meaningful opportu-
nity to be heard because they will have the opportunity to prepare
arguments against granting critical vendor motions. While the delay
may seem extreme in cases where critical vendor hearings are indeed
emergencies - that is, they are immediately necessary to the continued
operation of the debtor's business -"procedural due process is not in-
tended to promote efficiency. ' 179 Instead, procedural due process
protects the rights of those whose property is about to be taken
away. 180
Finally, if Congress were to enact legislation authorizing first day
orders, it would need to state any alteration to the priority scheme
provided for elsewhere in the Code is subject to this provision. This
would eliminate the attack made by secured creditors that critical ven-
dor orders "create rights not otherwise available under applicable
law."'181 Bankruptcy judges would no longer be creating rights for crit-
ical vendors. Applicable legislation would, itself, create those rights.
With a provision allowing alteration of the priority scheme reflected in
other sections of the Code, bankruptcy judges who authorize first day
orders would be respecting the priority scheme created by
Congress.1 82
Of these two possible solutions, it seems clear that the best solution
is for Congress to amend the Code. Congress should enact legislation
that will provide bankruptcy judges with the power to authorize pay-
ments of prepetition claims to critical vendors. This solution would
solve both of the problems outlined by this Comment. It would create
the statutory authority that the District Court for the Northern Dis-
177. Tabb, supra note 97, at 75.
178. Id. at 105.
179. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1971). The Supreme Court stated that
"[p]rocedural due process is not intended to promote efficiency or accommodate all possible
interests: it is intended to protect the particular interests of the person whose possessions are
about to be taken." Id. In the case of critical vendor orders, creditors are the people whose
possessions are about to be taken because the debtor is giving to "critical" vendors money that is
rightfully owed to noncritical vendors.
180. Id.
181. Southern Railway Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co. (In re Johnson Bronze Co.), 758 F.2d 137,
141 (3d Cir. 1985).
182. For the argument that the respect must be given to the Code priority scheme, see Brigh-
ton, supra note 176, at 116.
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trict of Illinois found lacking in Capital Factors. It would also solve
the procedural due process problems of lack of adequate notice and
the lack of opportunity to be heard by prohibiting hearings held
within the first few days of filing of the bankruptcy petition. Although
the new legislation would still allow some creditors to be paid in full
while others receive just a fraction of what they are owed, it will curb
current bankruptcy judge's discretion in authorizing preplan payments
of prepetition claims and will provide bankruptcy judges with guide-
lines for determining when a vendor is critical and when a critical ven-
dor should be paid. Clear guidance will ease the difficulty of
balancing the desire for reorganization against the risk of wasting the
assets in the debtor's estate. 183
VI. CONCLUSION
Critical vendor orders lack statutory authority as the Code stands
today. Although section 105(a) empowers the bankruptcy courts with
certain equitable powers, it does not cure the ills of lacking statutory
authority. The circuits are in agreement that this section does not au-
thorize the bankruptcy courts to approve critical vendor orders be-
cause such orders, among other things, alter the existing priority
scheme.
Due process is also a problem that plagues critical vendor orders.
Creditors who oppose the payment of prepetition claims to certain
other creditors are not provided with their constitutionally guaranteed
opportunity to be heard because the hearings on critical vendor mo-
tions occur almost immediately. In addition, such creditors receive
almost no notice about these hearings and are, thus, not provided with
their constitutionally guaranteed reasonable amount of time to ap-
pear, which includes time to prepare.
These two ills that plague critical vendor orders can only be reme-
died through federal legislation specifically providing bankruptcy
courts with the power to authorize payment of prepetition claims
before confirmation of the reorganization plan. Such legislation will
provide statutory authority. It would also provide notice require-
ments that must be met before a hearing can take place, and this will
cure the due process problem. In order to quell the controversy over
such orders, Congress must enact adequate legislation.
183. See Tabb, supra note 97, at 114 (explaining that judges must balance these competing
interests while facing lack of guidance and lack of time).
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